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CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF SPECIAL
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION

T

HE phrase "special community property" is not used in the

Texas statutes. It is an expression used by the bar to designate that portion of the community estate, (i.e., rents from the
wife's separate lands, interest from her bonds and notes, dividends
from her stock, and her personal earnings) which Article 4616'
of the Texas Statutes exempts from the debts and torts of the husband, which Article 46232 makes subject to the debts of the wife,
and which under the cases receives special treatment hereinafter
discussed. 3
In Texas, the law in regard to the control and disposition of this
special community property is in a confused and unsettled state.
To present the subject in as clear a form as possible, a resort to
subtopics will be necessary. The title suggests that the topic should
be divided into control on the one hand and disposition on the
other. Upon review of the authorities, however, it becomes apparent that they do not emphasize this distinction, logical though it is.
Both the cases and the writers use the entire phrase "control and
disposition" without drawing much, if any, distinction between the
two.
One classification suggested by both the authorities and Article
4616 is the one to be used herein: i.e., (1) rents and revenues
from the wife's separate realty; (2) income from the wife's separate securities; and (3) the wife's personal earnings. It is felt
I TEx.

REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 4616.

2 Id., Art. 4623.
3 It is the policy of the courts to strictly construe Article 4616 in that they refuse to

extend it to cover revenues from other types of separate property owned by the wife.
Simmons v. Sikes, 56 S. W. (2d) 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) writ of error refused (royalty from a product patent).
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that under this classification the varying rules as to each type of
special community property are more easily dealt with and more
easily understood.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Under the Texas Civil Statutes of 1911," and prior thereto, the
special community property received no special treatment. It was,
like ordinary community property, subject to the exclusive control
and disposition of the husband. Furthermore the husband had full
control of the separate property of the wife. In 1913 the Texas
Legislature gave the wife the exclusive right of control and disposition of her separate property and exempted all the items of special
community from the husband's debts.' It also gave the wife exclusive control of the items of special community and the right of
disposition thereof (subject to an ambiguous requirement of the
husband's joinder).' The special significance of this statute will
be noted later in this comment. The next important change was
made in 1917, when what is now Article 4614 was amended to
make the "rents and revenues" from the wife's separate realty part
of her separate estate. The act of 1921 (exempting the husband's
separate property from the wife's torts) left this subtsantially unchanged. This provision, however, was declared unconstitutional in
the landmark case of Arnold v. Leonard,7 as being in conflict with
the definition of the wife's separate property contained in the Texas
Constitution.' The 1925 revision, nevertheless, defined the wife's
separate property as including both the rents and revenues from
her separate realty and the income from her securities.9 In Article
4616 of the same revision, the legislature exempted these same
items (except revenues from the wife's land) plus the wife's earnings and her separate property from the debts and torts of the hus4 TEx. REV. CiV.

STAT. (1911) Art. 4621.
5 Gen. Laws Reg. Sess., 33rd Leg., 1913, c. 32, p. 61.
6Ibid.
7 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
8 Thx. CONST., Art. 16, § 15.
9 Tix. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 4614.
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band. It is noteworthy that in this article the legislature used language which suggested that none of these items of special community property were the wife's separate property:
"... neither the separate property of the wife, nor the rents from the
wife's separate real estate, nor the interest on bonds and notes belonging to her, nor dividends on stocks owned by her, nor her personal earnings shall be subject to payment of debts contracted by the husband nor
of torts of the husband." (Italics supplied.)
It is difficult to understand why the italicized portion should have
been included, unless the legislature itself was doubtful 'Whether
its inclusion of these items as the wife's separate property in Article 4614 was constitutional. In 1929 the legislature amended
Article 4614 by omitting after the words "thus acquired" the
words "and the rents and revenues derived therefrom, the interest
on bonds and notes belonging to her and dividends on stock owned
by her." This, in effect, removed these items from the category of
her separate estate, but under Article 4616, special community
property remains exempt from the husband's debts and torts.
RENTS AND REVENUES FROM THE WIFE'S SEPARATE REALTY

The law on this topic as it stands today is molded by the leading
case of Hawkins v. Britton State Bank."0 The facts of that case
were essentially these: plaintiff, a married woman, sued for the
value of certain farm machinery purchased with rents from her
separate estate. Without her knowledge or consent, her husband
had conveyed the machinery to defendant bank in payment of a
community debt contracted by the husband. It was held that the
rents from the wife's separate estate were community property,
but were under the exclusive control of the wife, and were not
subject to debts contracted by the husband.
Nowhere in the Hawkins case does the court expressly say that
the mutuated forms of these rents (i.e., merchandise bought with
such rents) are subject to the rule which it lays down in respect
10 122 Tex. 69, 52 S. W. (2d) 243 (Tex. Con App. 1932) opinion adopted.
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to the rents themselves, nor does the court expressly hold that these
rents are to be disposed of by the wife exclusively. However, the
court implies strongly that the rule as to rents applies to the mutations thereof in that the certified questions sent up by the court of
civil appeals dealt purely with the mutated form, and the opinion
deals only with the rents in its reasoning and applies the results
to the machinery bought therewith. Judge Critz in the Hawkins case
quotes with approval the following language of Judge Greenwood
in the case of Arnold v. Leonard:"
"The legislature.., could lawfully deprive the husband of the power
...

to manage and control the wife's separate property and portions of

the community property which were derived from the use of the wife's
separate property or from her personal exertions and could confide the
12
management, control and disposition thereof to the wife alone."
(Italics supplied.)
Judge Critz must have recognized that the statute making the language of Judge Greenwood just quoted applicable was no longer
in force; therefore, he apparently felt that the law with respect
to rents without the aid of a special statute was that the wife has
the control and disposition thereof. This conclusion is further
corroborated by the fact that another portion of the Hawkins opinion states unequivocally that the rents from the wife's separate
lands "are under the exclusive management and control of the
wife, and cannot be subjected to the payment of debts contracted
by the husband, either by execution or otherwise without the wife's
consent. ' ' 3 (Italics supplied.) The overall effect of the statements
just quoted from the two opinions leads us to the conclusion that
Judge Critz intended to hold that the wife has the sole right of
control and disposition of the rents and revenues from her separate
realty, and probably of the goods bought therewith. (The holding
might possibly be limited to forbidding the husband to convey the
mutated product to his creditors, while otherwise allowing him
11 Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
12 Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69 75 52 S. W. (2d) 243, 246 (1932).
is ibid.
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control and disposition thereof; but such a distinction seems unlikely.) The court said that such control and disposition of rents
by the wife were necessary in order that the rights conferred upon
her by Article 4614-viz., the sole control and disposition of her
separate property be not hollow and empty. 4 It seems that the
wife should control and dispose of the goods bought with rents
for another reason also: rents are either cash or crops; the only
uses for cash are depositing it (which involves a conveyance of the
cash to the bank, in exchange for a chose in action, the bank balance) or spending it; the principal use for crop rents is selling
the crops. Thus, almost invariably, rents undergo prompt mutation.
Allowing the wife to control and dispose of only the rents is indeed
a relatively insubstantial right.
Another case that seems to be in point on this part of the topic
is Chandler v. Alamo Mfg. Co." It clearly holds that the rents and
revenues from the wife's separate realty are subject to the control
of the husband as is the rest of the community estate. Therefore
the holding in the Chandler case is squarely in conflict with the
holding in the Hawkins case. The court did not even mention the
Hawkins case, but relied instead upon the case of Pottorf v. J. D.
Adams Co., Inc.," which deals only with the wife's personal earnings. It is doubtful that in relying upon the Pottorf case the court
followed the proper authority, because first, that case dealt with
another portion of the special community having distinctive features, and secondly, the Hawkins case was squarely in point. Furthermore, the Chandler case has no writ of error history and is
therefore greatly overshadowed by the authority of the Hawkins
17
case.
The case of Marshall v. Smith," is the only other case bearing
directly upon this point. It holds that the mutated form of the rents
This case is noted in 11 TEx. L. REV. 391 (1933).
15 140 S. W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
16 70 S. W. (2d) 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) writ of errorrefused.
17 The Chandler case is noted in 19 TEx. L. REV. 204 (1941).
"8 199 S. W. (2d) 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
14
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from the wife's separate realty is subject to the exclusive control
of the husband. The court cites no cases in support of this proposition; furthermore, like the Chandler case it has no writ of error
history and therefore stands no higher than a bare civil appeals
opinion.
A case which might be construed to apply to the question of
who controls and disposes of the property bought with the rents is
that of Strickland v. Wester. 9 In that case the husband's creditors
attempted to seize land which the wife had bought with her personal earnings. The court declared that when the wife's personal
earnings are converted into other property, that property is subject
to the debts of the husband. Thus the court refused to allow that
particular item of special community to retain its characteristics
of special community, when converted into other property. Instead,
it then takes the nature of ordinary community property, to the
extent that it is subject to the debts of the husband. What did the
court mean by saying that this property is subject to the debts of
the husband? Did it mean that the husband could voluntarily convey it to his creditors to satisfy his debts, or did it mean only that
the creditors could seize the property to satisfy such debts? Since
the court used the words, "the same as any other community property," it probably meant that it is subject to both voluntary conveyance by the husband to his creditors and seizure by such
creditors.
It could be argued that this same holding should apply not
only to the wife's personal earnings, but also to the other items
of special community, because they are all members of the same
class. If it does apply, it overrules the Hawkins case as to mutations of rents, for it is a more recent case.
It is doubtful, however, whether this holding applies to the
mutations of the other item (rents, interest, and dividends). First,
it should not apply unless there is a close analogy between them,
and there is no such analogy. There is a basic difference between
19 112 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex. Com. App. 1938) opinion adopted.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

rents, interest and dividends from the wife's separate property, on
the one hand, and the wife's personal earnings on the other. As to
the former group, there is a corpus, separately owned, controlled
and disposed of by the wife, from which income is derived. As
to the wife's personal earnings, there is no such corpus. Further,
the legislative history of earnings is considerably different from
that of the rents, interest and dividends. Secondly, the two cases
(Hawkins and Strickland) should be reconciled, if reasonably possible; and it can be accomplished very simply by limiting the
Strickland case to the subject matter with which it dealt, viz., prop.
erty bought with the wife's personal earnings.
It might be argued that since there are only three basic types
of property in Texas: (husband's separate property, wife's separate
property, and community property), mutations should apply only
to these basic types; therefore, that special community property,
when converted into other property, should lose its identity as such
and become mere ordinary community property, thus fully liable
for the husband's debts and subject to the husband's control and
disposition. The argument is strengthened by Articles 4620 and
3661, which provide apparently that all community property is
liable for both the husband's and the wife's debts, except where
other statutes provide otherwise; whence it seems that Article
4616 should be construed strictly, to exempt only the four items
it mentions (rents, interest, dividends and earnings). Thus the
property purchased with such items should be subject to seizure
for the husband's debts (a result exactly consonant with the Strickland case); and since voluntary conveyance usually parallels involuntary conveyance by creditors, such purchased property would
probably be subject to the husband's control and disposition. The
Hawkins case's holding as to rents, that the husband could not convey the mutated product thereof to his creditor, might possibly be
based on failure to distinguish sharply between rents and property
bought therewith; just as the Supreme Court in Cauble v. Brown.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
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Electra Refining Co.20 inexactly stated, as to oil well rigs and machinery, that "they were personal earnings of" the wife.
While the preceding argument is a strong one in regard to the
wife's personal earnings, it has less force in regard to her rents,
because the Hawkins case, by holding that the wife has exclusive
control and disposition of such rents, aparently made this item a
very definite type of property, with characteristics of such great
importance that it seems they should be preserved and carried over
to the property bought therewith. Furthermore, the reasoning of
the Hawkins case (that the statutory right of the wife to have control and disposition of her separate property would be an empty
one, unless she also be given the right to control and dispose of the
rents therefrom) applies with substantially equal force to the
property which she buys with such rents.
Admittedly, this question of who controls and disposes of the
property bought with rents from the wife's separate property is
one on which the state of the law is not at all clear. But due to the
basic difference between such rents and earnings, their differing
legislative histories, and the desire that the courts will probably
have to reconcile these cases, it is likely that the Strickland case
will be limited to its facts, and the Hawkins case will prevail as the
major authority concerning the property bought with rents.
Therefore, it appears that the Hawkins case is the strongest
authority in respect to the rents and revenues2 from the wife's
separate lands, and that case holds in effect that the rents and
revenues from her separate realty and probably the mutated forms
thereof are subject to the sole control and disposition of the wife.
INCOME FROM SECURITIES (STOCKS, BONDS, AND NOTES)

A thorough search of the cases fails to reveal a single authority
dealing with the dividends from the wife's separate stock or the
interest from her bonds and notes. Therefore we are committed to
20

115 Tex. 1, 274 S. W. 120 (1925).

21

See note 26, infra.
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analogous cases and the statutes as a basis for arriving at a conclusion as to their control and disposition.
A close analogy can be found between this portion of the special
community property and rents and revenues from the wife's separate realty. Both of the types consists of income from a corpus
which is owned and managed exclusively by the wife as her separate property and which may be disposed of by her. The sole
qualification upon such conveyance by the wife is that the husband must join as to stocks and bonds, only. This qualification
upon her disposition is not too stringent, in that if the husband
refuses to join she may obtain a court order allowing her to proceed alone. Because of this strong analogy, the reasoning of the
Hawkins case is particularly applicable to these items; i.e., the
wife's statutory right to control and dispose of her separate securities would be an empty one were she not also given the right to
control and dispose of the income therefrom.
Turning to the statutes, one is faced with the problem of statutory construction. Looking at them as they are today without taking
into consideration the legislative history behind them, one might
be forced to.the conclusion that the income from her securities as
a part of the communiLy estate is subject to the sole control and
disposition of the husband. However, a survey of the history of
these statutes seems to cast doubt upon this conclusion. (This history has been reviewed earlier in this comment, but the significance thereof has been reserved for discussion at this point.) At
first the husband had control of the special community items. Then
with the increase of women's rights generally in the United States,
the legislature in 1913 gave the wife the reins. Apparently having
been pleased with what they must have felt was a step in the right
direction, in 1925 they went the second mile and made all of these
items, except the wife's personal earnings, part of the wife's separate estate. There was no longer any need for the special statute
of 1913 giving the wife control and disposition of these items, for
she already had full rights over her separate property. So this spe-
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cial statute was dropped in the revision of that year. Clearly the
legislature had remained within the bounds of the constitution
heretofore, but now it had exceeded them, and the court said
so in the case of Arnold v. Leonard. Even so it was not until four
years later in 1929 that a new legislature repealed the portion of
Article 4614 being discussed. By such repeal there is no doubt
that the legislature intended to remove rents, interest and dividends
from the category of the wife's separate property, but there is considerable doubt that it intended to remove it from the control of
the wife. Is it reasonable to assume that upon being forced to
abandon the second step of this progressive experiment, the legislature intended also to abandon the first step with which it had
apparently been so well pleased? We think not. Of course, the
authors realize that this interpretation calls for the assumption that
the new legislature overlooked the possibility that the wife's control of this property might revert to the husband, as a result of
its repeal of that portion of the statute which made these items
her separate property and its failure to re-insert the 1913 statute
giving her control of these items.
As shown above, there is a compelling analogy between interest
and dividends and rents, so that the results reached in the Hawkins
case as to rents should be applied to interest and dividends. However, because there are no cases directly on the point and further
because a literal reading of the statutes (Articles 4614, 4616,
4619, and 4620) as they exist today gives the control and disposition to the husband, one can only conclude that the question is
unsettled. The most one can reasonably say is that the courts will
probably hold the same way in regard to interest and dividends
and their mutated products as it held in the Hawkins case in regard to rents and their mutated products.
THE WIFE'S PERSONAL EARNINGS

There is less confusion in the law dealing with this segment of
special community property than exists in regard to the preceding
two. Neither the reasoning predicated upon the legislative history
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of the topic nor the analogy to rents from her separate lands applies
with force to the wife's earnings; so the Hawkins case is inapplicable. From 1913 to 1925, the legislature did confide the control
of her personal earnings to the wife by special statute, but at no
time did it place them in the category of her separate property as
it did the other items of special community property. Thus, because the legislature failed to include in its 1925 revision the special statute of 1913 which gave the wife the control of these earnings, it is very likely that it fully intended to, and did, return this
control to the husband. Further, the established principle that the
labor of either spouse is community labor and the fruits therefrom
are community property, supports this result. The analogy to rents
from land is inapplicable in that there is no corpus owned separately by the wife from which the income stems.
The few cases upon this point substantiates this conclusion by
saying that the husband has control of the wife's earnings, subject
to their exemption from his debts and torts.2" As is pointed out in
Speer's Law of Marital Rights in Texas23 this results in the anomalous situation that the husband may voluntarily convey the wife's
earnings to his creditors in satisfaction of his debts, but the creditors may not seize them.
It would appear that the products bought with the wife's personal earnings do not receive the protection which Article 4616
extends to the earnings themselves. Thus, it was held in the case
of Stickland v. Wester2 ' that "when such earnings are converted
into other property, that property is subject to debts contracted by
the husband the same as any other community property."2 5
To summarize, the only thing special about the wife's personal
earnings is that they are not subject to seizure by the husband's
creditors to satisfy his debts. In all other respects they are treated
as ordinary community property.
2'

Pottorf v. J. D. Adams Co., supra, note 16.

23 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS,

Strickland v. Wester, supra, note 19.
25 Id. at 1048.

24

§ 358 (3rd ed. 1929).
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CONCLUSION

As to the rents and revenues from the wife's separate land, the
following rules seem to be established by the authorities: (1) they
are subject to the control and disposition of the wife alone; (2)
the wife probably has the sole right of control and disposition of
property into which such rents and revenues are converted; (3)
neither the rents and revenues" nor the mutated forms thereof are
subject to the debts or torts of the husband through levy by creditors or conveyance by the husband.27 As to the control and disposition of the income from the wife's separate securities, the law is
unsettled. Because, however, of the close analogy to rents, and the
identical legislative history behind the statutes dealing with the
two, it seems likely that the law as to rents will be applied to the
income from the wife's separate securities.2"
It seems clear that the wife's personal earnings receive no special consideration other than that accorded them in Article 4616,
i.e., they may not be seized to satisfy the husband's debts or torts.
26 There is some doubt as to whether this rule applies to "revenues" from the wife's
lands. "Rents" and "revenues" are distinct categories, though obviously the latter could
include the former. Article 4616, exempting the special community property from the
husband's debts and torts, lists "rents" but not "revenues"-and it should probably be
strictly construed to exempt only what it says. However, the attempt in 1917 to broaden
the wife's separate estate (discussed supra) included "rents and revenues." The Hawkins
case (discussed supra), certainly by its rationale and probably by its language, treats
rents and revenues on the same footing. Therefore the rule stated is probably accurate,
but there is much doubt as to levy by the husband's creditors on "revenues" (other than
rent) and the mutated forms thereof.
27 On this point, other community property states differ as follows: 1 DE FUNIAK,

PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,

§§

71, 115, 2 de Funiak 526-616 (1943).

Arizona-Increase, rents, issues and profits of wife's separate property are wife's
separate property.
Calijornia-Rents, issue and profits of wife's separate property are wife's separate
property. Wife may, without consent of husband, convey same.
Idaho-Rents and profits from wife's separate property are community property,
unless the instrument conveying the property to wife provides that they be applied to
her sole and separate use. In that case she alone may dispose of them and they are not
subject to the debts of husband. Whether or not the instrument so provides, wife has
control and management thereof.

Louisiana-Rents, issues and profits of wife's separate property, however administered, are community property unless the wife by written instrument duly notarized and
witnessed declares and reserves it as her separate property.
Michigan-All property originally derived from wife's separate property is wife's
separate property. Wife has sole right to manage, control and dispose of it.
28 For the differences in other community property states, ibid.

